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I.

INTRODUCTION

As the 1967 Term of the United States Supreme Court came to a
close, the curtain was also drawn on the thirty-first year of service by
Justice Hugo Lafayette Black. Few men have served as Justice longer
than Black.' Few have had the impact, however long their tenure. This
article is an attempt to condense and evaluate that part of his service
which represents his approach to the system of American constitutional
democracy. In other words, what is sought here is a restatement of Justice
Black's contribution to the way we view our form of government, a form
of government which he has characterized as "the last best hope of
earth."2
* Assistant Professor of Law, Law School of Louisiana State University. This article
was written in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the L.L.M. degree at the Law
School of Harvard University.
1. Only six justices have served longer: Field (34 1/2); Marshall

(34 1/2); Harlan

(33 4/5); Story (33 3/4); McLean (32 4/5); and Wayne (32 1/2). Dilliard, Hugo Black
and The Importance of Freedom, 10 AiER. U.L. REV. 7, n.1 (1961).
2. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 169 (1961).
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The Limits of This Study

There are depressing limitations which inhere in any attempt to
write comprehensively in the constitutional field. The cases rarely raise
other than the weighty, issue-laden questions of the times. Study of them
involves the interminable interrelations between one question and another, between one case and another, and between one Justice and
another. The problem is not that of finding fascinating points of discussion, it is rather in finding a basis for delimiting and organizing
discussion in order to produce a readable and yet useful analysis. The
greatest challenge is the need for meaningful limitations on verbosity.
In an attempt to respond to these problems, the writer has chosen
to follow a building block approach. It proceeds by: (1) outlining the
mode of analysis; (2) giving a brief glimpse of Justice Black as a person,
yet an historical figure; (3) analyzing his responses to the three most
fundamental constitutional conflicts related to democracy in America;
and (4) concluding with a brief attempt to provide an overview and
evaluation of Black's service. Hopefully, the approach will prove successful.3
B.

The Perspective of This Study

The cases which find their way before the Supreme Court are rarely
simple or clear cut, especially those presenting constitutional issues.
Most people seem willing to accept this reality. Yet it seems equally
clear that both layman and lawyer are oftimes driven to befuddlement
by the not infrequent appearance of decisions and opinions marked by
conflict within the Court, as well as within a line of opinions written by
individual members of the Court.
There are numerous explanations available and reasons why these
nine men, all of whom take the same oath to support, defend and interpret
the same Constitution divide among and within themselves on the import
of that duty and document to given cases. From those possible explanations, this writer has chosen one upon which the ensuing analysis builds.
The gist of the chosen explanation is conveyed by the phrase, "reasoned prejudices." Reduced to its elemental assumptions, this notion
3. Some other limitations of the paper should be conceded at the outset. One such
limitation is that the paper is dependent upon the writer's knowledge and the published
expressions of the Justice himself. Only rarely has reference been made to sources other
than his opinions or speeches. While a sincere effort has been made to include all of his
relevant opinions in the analysis, no effort has been made to scrutinize records on appeal or
transcripts of oral argument, and certainly no access to personal papers is pretended.
Finally, it must be stated at the outset that no attempt has been made to thoroughly
critique individual opinions or groups of opinions, other than the overview critique with
which the paper concludes. For those who might seek such analysis, some effort has been
made to provide, via footnote, reference to articles which have sought to achieve this objective. This is, therefore, far more a general paper about Justice Black and democracy, than
it is a general paper about constitutional law.
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proceeds from an appreciation of the particular desire of judges for
rationality, yet an equal appreciation of the inevitable influence of personal prejudices upon the capacity for rationality and consistency. Thus
the term "reasoned prejudice" is an attempt to accommodate the press
of ideological preferences upon the institutionally imposed duty of
rational judicial resolution of constitutional conflicts. The distinctive
blend of these two somewhat conflicting influences is felt to render the
"reasoned prejudice" notion particularly valuable in light of the individual Justice here under examination.
Given a desire to make such an accommodation, it follows that our
analysis should commence with a search for those prejudices. And it
seems equally compelling that such a search commence with an attempt,
however brief, to understand something of the man who, some thirty
years ago, rose to the exalted position of Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.
II.

THE MAN WHO BECAME A JUSTICE

As befitting his position in our history, Black's life and career are
nearly exemplary of the aspirations and values most popularized by
conventional American biographies.4 He was born eighty years ago in a
small Alabama town to parents of moderate means. From those relatively
humble beginnings, largely by the force of his own abilities and of the
times, he has risen to the highest level of achievement and respect our
nation offers to those in the legal profession. The path his life took along
the way to that office offers itself to at least brief examination.
Hugo Black's early years were unmarked by events or achievements of great consequence. His chief biographers place principal emphasis on the populist leanings of his father and their middle class
economic station as formative influences. Their emphasis would certainly appear justified in terms of his evidenced perspective of our political and economic institutions.
The populists were characterized by their then brazen suggestions
regarding use of the political process to effect reform of the economic
order. The suggestion has since matured into reality, albeit still brazen
to some, and in that transformation Justice Black, as Senator Black,
played a principal role. Few men more typified the New Deal legislator
than did the Senator from Alabama. Indeed it was this congruity which
probably placed him on the Court.
4. As of this writing, there have been two efforts of a biographical nature and the
ensuing discussion draws equally on both. They are: J. FRANK, MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE
MAN AND His OPINIoNs (1949); C. WiLLAMs, HUGo L. BLACK, A STUDY IN THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1950). Another more integrated analysis of his life and his writings is Reich, Mr.
Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1963). Still another recent
work is STRICKLAND, HUGO BLACK AND THE SumpsrE COURT: A Symposium (1967).
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His economic status is similarly an appropriate aspect of his early
life to single out for its influence on him. The middle station on the
economic ladder carries with it some distinctly advantageous consequences for those in search of perspectives. The middle lies close enough
to the lower rungs to render one as aware as he desires of the plight of
those less fortunate; and yet, it sufficiently enables one to appreciate the
opportunities for further climbing, should that be a desired course. Hugo
Black made full use of both of these perspectives. His affection for progressive economic legislation more than amply demonstrates his solicitude for the interests of the unfortunate. It is a solicitude which took
other forms as well, some of which will be further examined, but he
was very accurately characterized by Senator Norris as a person to
whom the unfortunate could look for understanding and assistance. Yet
at the same time, Hugo Black was markedly a person possessed by the
aspiring perspective which so typifies the middle class. Despite hard
economic times and periodic setbacks, his efforts from the very start were
those of a young man in pursuit of all the achievement both conscience
and circumstance would permit.
His early legal experiences are highly illustrative of his attitude.
He had not begun with a commitment to a legal career. It came by
circumstance, a negative one. Seeking admission to college in preparation for a medical career, he found himself unsuited for that study and
was deflected into the profession in which he has since ascended to the
peak. His initial efforts in private practice were primarily that of a
claimant's counsel, a vocation for which he found himself well suited
and hence highly successful. It cannot be overlooked that throughout
this time, Black's sensitivity to the causes of the injured (and against
the insurers) were at least reinforced if not molded.
When he took his first step into public office, however, it could
well have been a change of course for the young attorney, for it was as
a prosecuting attorney that his official career commenced. But the views
of the man were already framed, and Black turned his tenure as prosecuting attorney into a somewhat different experience than that typically felt
and achieved by others in similar positions. His major efforts as prosecutor were to expose and destroy police abuses. In many ways the years
he spent in this position, and subsequently as police judge, proved more
about his mettle than any prior experience. His performances were
those of a reformer, sensitive to the circumstances of the unfortunate
and willing to use public office as a tool to reshape those circumstances.
It was largely on the strength of those performances, as well as
his outstanding reputation and capacity for advocacy, that Hugo Black
managed to wend his way into the high office of United States Senator
in 1926. It was expectable that the same inclinations and capacities he
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previously displayed would also serve him as the guidelines in his new
capacity. For a brief period of time he played the quiescent role of
novice within that select rank, but his strong convictions and talents
soon came to the fore. In short course he could be grouped with a select
few, such as Senators George Norris and Claude Pepper, as a principal
architect and advocate of the economic reform spawned by Roosevelt
and those depressing times.
Chief among the proposals he supported were utility cooperatives,
minimum wage and maximum (35) hour legislation, the attempt at
Court-packing, and the investigation of abuse by big business. His investigatory activities would seem to merit further comment.
Black came to the Senate with less than devoted obeisance to the
industrial and commercial giants. He also came with acknowledged flair
and expertise as a trial attorney, skilled in the ways of interrogation and
discovery. The prejudice and the talent combined with opportunity
when Black became the chairman of a Senate committee empowered to
look into various abuses consummated by business, and often accomplished with the full complicity of various governmental officials. Looking
back on his service in that role, one may say that only the committee's
capacity for accomplishment of its aims commends itself to positive
evaluation. To say that, as a Senator, Black demonstrated little judicial
temperament, that he evinced little respect for the Supreme Court as
an essential participant in our nation's institutional framework, indeed,
to say that he showed little or no concern for trangressing constitutional
barriers, is to remain well within the bounds of understatement. It
should not be surprising, then, to note that an uproar, rarely equalled
in our nation's history, accompanied his appointment to the Court. More
surprising was the immediate excuse, if not the cause, of that uproar.
In his early days in Alabama politics, and for some period thereafter, Black had become affiliated with the Ku Klux Klan. When his
ascendancy to the Court became imminent, a reporter for the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette broke a story which disclosed that aspect of his past
and charged that Black maintained the affiliation. The force of this
disclosure was enormous, and it cast a pall over his recently confirmed
nomination that forced the nominee to break with longstanding precedent
in an effort to calm the aroused nation. Having made that attempt, what.ever its success, Black promptly took his position on the Court. And it
is the consequences of that transition with which we are here concerned.
III.

ASSURING LEGISLATIVE PRIMACY

Our examination of Justice Black's service begins, as the text of
the Constitution itself began, with an examination of the scope and
import of his commitment to the democratic premise. Article one of the
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Constitution directed the attention of all to the most fundamental innovation of the American scheme of government-the root allocation of
legislative authority in popular will. This principle has served as the
first article of faith for Justice Black as well; it appears accurate to
characterize the concept of democratic rule as his most deeply held and
clearly motivating prejudice.
Black came to the Court in 1937. The year was perhaps the most
pivotal in our judicial history:
The crucial issue prior to 1937 was whether the Constitution
prohibited government- state and federal-from interfering
with the free play of economic forces (outside the field of public utilities)-no matter how great the public need. Federal legislation dealing with other phases of national or interstate industry was on important occasions found to invade powers
reserved to the states. State laws were frequently found invalid
because they impinged on the field of interstate commerce
committed by the Constitution to the Federal Congress. And
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were held to bar both state and federal governments
from regulating such economic factors as prices, wages and
labor relations in businesses "not affected with a public
interest."'
The persistent frustration of legislative enactments via this tripartite
formulation threatened to push aside the Supreme Court as an institutional partner in the Constitutional scheme. And, it should be noted,
as a Senator, Black stood among those who were willing to man the
bulldozer. As history has had it, the bulldozing was not accomplished,
and when Mr. Justice Black took his place on the Court a substantial
degree of the pressure had been alleviated. Yet, it is also true that these
three barriers to legislative primacy remained as the major issues which
he was called upon to resolve in his earliest years, and it is thus fitting
that we begin our examination by consideration of his responses to them.
A.

FederalLegislative Authority

Section eight of article one of the Constitution enumerates the bulk
of the authority reposed in the federal legislative branch. As a constitutional issue, the significant power has proven to be the power given to Congress to regulate interstate commerce. Strict construction of this grant of
authority was an oft employed device with which economic interests
were insulated from governmental interference by the pre-1937 Court.
The interpretative gloss, heavily weighted and confined by talismanic
phrases, placed all manner of commercial activity beyond the effective
S. Stem, The Problems of Yesteryear-Commerce and Due Process, 4 VAND. L. REv.
445, 446 (1951) (footnotes omitted).
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reach of Congress, notwithstanding explicit Congressional determination
that an area was of sufficient national concern to warrant federal
regulation.
This gloss and its effects were shattered and buried soon after
Black came to the Court. As a junior he participated primarily by
votes," rather than by opinions, in the line of decisions which, by 1942,
saw the Court reject wooden phrases in favor of a more realistic construction attuned to the nature of twentieth century commercial activity.'
He joined, for instance, a 1942 majority in Kirschbaum v. Walling
which upheld the constitutionality of labor legislation as applied to an
elevator operator which sharply constrasted with a 1936 decision 9 which
held that labor regulations of the coal industry were not within the
reach of the interstate commerce power. Similarly, he was party to the
unanimous decision of the Court in Wickard v. Filburn, ° which held
that the production of an individual wheat farmer could be within the
reach of the commerce power-a sharp contrast to earlier decisions like
the first AAA case."
Yet Black was not forever mute on the commerce clause issue. In
1944 he authored the Court's opinion in United States v. South Eastern
Underwriter's Ass'n,'2 which offered a first glimpse of his perspective
of the constitutional areas of interstate commerce, as well as his approach
to the role of the Court as Constitutional implementor.
Prior to the Underwriter's case a line of the Court's decisions had
characterized the business of insurance as state commerce for the purposes of rendering the industry amenable to state regulation and taxation. This case, however, presented the opposite issue. Activities within.
the industry had led the federal government to proceed against some
companies for alleged violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, an Act
whose effective reach was, on the whole, premised upon and thus confined by the interstate commerce power. It was the contention of the
companies that the Act was not intended to apply to the insurance
industry, and that even were it so read, it could not constitutionally
apply inasmuch as the Court had previously characterized their business
to be intrastate,not interstate commerce.
6. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel,
316 U.S. 572 (1942); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941); United States
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
7. "[Q]uestions of the power of Congress are not decided by reference to any formula
which would give controlling force to nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and
for close consideration of the actual effects of activity in question upon interstate commerce." Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
8. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
9. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
10. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
11. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
12. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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The plea posed an ostensible dilemma for Justice Black, seemingly
pitting his prejudice in favor of economic regulation against his prejudice
in favor of preserving the domain of legislative authority, albeit state
authority. Equal to the challenge, he boldly passed through the horns
of the dilemma and reached an accommodation of all of his preferences.
In what was to become characteristic fashion, he combined a literal
reading with an historical development in order to explain his view of
the commerce clause. Discounting as irrelevant the cases upon which
the industry relied, he held the business of insurance to be subject to
federal regulation to the extent that it engaged in commercial activity
via interstate activity and subject to state regulation for those aspects
of its business transacted in any one state. The enunciated basis of his
conclusion was a sense of judicial restraint firmly rooted in the legislative prerogative:
Our basic responsibility in interpreting the Commerce Clause
is to make certain that the power to govern intercourse among
the states remains where the Constitution put it. That power, as
held by this Court from the beginning, is vested in Congress,
available to be exercised
for the national welfare as Congress
13
shall deem necessary.
The culminative impact of this decision and those which preceded
it has been to render nearly moot the question whether Congress has
correctly determined that a given activity should fall within the reach
of its interstate commerce power. As a result, there have been few subsequent occasions for further exposition by Justice Black in this area. Yet
the dearth of additional opinions should not serve to minimize the significance of his efforts in this area to his overall philosophy. As was
illustrated by his concurring opinion in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States,' 4 the view he takes of the commerce clause is but one
part of his comprehensive and affectionate protection of all levels of
legislative authority in our federal system and his dislike of judicial
supervision of that authority. It is a view, as he has explained, which
is much akin to that of Chief Justice Marshall:
The genius and character of the whole government seems to be
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect States
generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with which
it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing
some of the general powers of the government.' 5
The view is one which he has carried onward into the battle against the
13. Id. at 552-553.
14. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
15. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824), as quoted by Black in Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 at 273 (1964).
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second pre-1937 device: strict construction of state legislative authority
in the economic arena.
B.

State Legislative Authority

A second device employed by the pre-1937 Court to inhibit legislative encroachments on the laissez-faire framework was narrow construction of state power in the area of regulation and taxation of commerce.
The Constitutional footing for this device is an implication arising out
of the Article One grant to Congress of authority of the power to regulate commerce among the several states. The implication is that, absent
delegation of this authority, Congress possesses its power to the exclusion of the states. At once, the boundaries of interstate commerce were
narrowly defined (to limit the reach of the federal Congress), and
broadly defined (to exclude the states from trespassing upon the federal
province). The practical effect and obvious purpose of this formal contradiction was clearly neither concern for nationalism nor for state's
rights. Black saw it for what it was, an example of the use of judicial
doctrine to frustrate legislative authority in order to protect an economic
philosophy held by judges but rejected by the popular majority. Accordingly, he has spent a substantial portion of his efforts in an attempt
to destroy these implied negatives of state authority. Unlike the narrow
construction of federal authority, however, his efforts in this area have
met with less success. Thus, it must be pre-warned that the views about
to be examined here do not command a majority of the Court as of
this writing.
The cases in this area of state legislative competence fall into two
broad categories, regulation and taxation. In both, Mr. Justice Black's
prejudice in favor of legislative authority has led him to deny the constitutional validity of the implied pre-emption of state legislative power.
Easily the starting point for this discussion is the dissent Mr. Justice Black wrote in the 1945 Southern Pacific Railway case, 6 a challenge
to the authority of a state to regulate the length of interstate trains
while in its territory. The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice
Stone, relied upon the doctrine of pre-emption and rejected the conclusion of the state's legislature that a significant local interest was involved
sufficient to justify intrastate regulation of the interstate carrier. Black
categorically rejected each of the foundations for the majority's conclusion. Among them was the idea that congressional silence in the face
of widespread state regulations should not imply congressional acquiescence to the state legislation. Another was the idea that the Court could
infer an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce simply from
possible increased cost which could result from a given regulation. But,
16. Southern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945.)
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at the heart of his dissent was his opposition to any judicial doctrine
which would allow the judgment of a court to be substituted for that of
the popularly elected legislative representatives.
[T]he determination of whether it is in the interest of society for
[an aspect of commerce] to be governmentally regulated is a
matter of public policy. Someone must fix that policy-either
the Congress, or the state, or the courts. A century and a half
of constitutional history admonishes this Court to leave that
choice to the elected legislative representatives of the people
themselves, where it properly belongs both on democratic principles and the requirement of efficient government. 7
Characteristically, he refused to be swayed by arguments about the
complexity and variety of possible ramifications of state regulations
affecting interstate aspects of commercial affairs.
The balancing of these probabilities, however, is not in my judgment a matter for judicial determination, but one which calls
for legislative consideration. Representatives elected by the
people to make their laws, rather than judges appointed to
interpret those laws, can best determine the policies which
govern the people. That at least is the basic principle on which
our democratic society rests.' 8
This has remained Black's view even in cases where the majority of the
Court concluded that the motive behind state regulation was "economic
Balkanization."' 9 It is not that Justice Black is unaware of the need for
the federal principle of open commerce among the states,20 nor that he
rejects the historically documentable goal of national unity which apparently motivated the allocation of regulatory power over interstate
commerce to the Federal Congress. Rather, it appears to be another
instance of a choice which he has made between two alternative approaches to the interpretation of constitutional provisions: one of express
procedural allocation, the other of implied substantive content. As elsewhere, he stakes his faith in more objective procedural approach, and
17. Id. at 789.
18. Id. at 794-795.
19. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
20. In Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 550 (1949), he wrote:
Reconciliation of state and federal interests in regulation of commerce always has

been a perplexing problem. The claims of neither can be ignored if due regard be
accorded the welfare of state and nation. For in the long run the welfare of each
is dependant upon the welfare of both. Injury to commercial activities in the states
is bound to produce an injurious reaction on interstate commerce, and vice versa.
The many local activities which are parts of interstate transactions have given
rise to much confusion. The basic problem has always been whether the state or
federal government has power to regulate such local activities, whether the power
of either is exclusive or concurrent, whether the state has power to regulate until
Congress exercises its supreme power, and the extent to which and the circumstances under which this court should invalidate state regulations in the absence of
an exercise of congressional power.
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thereby precludes judicial encroachment on the legislature's realm.
Reduced to its essence, Mr. Justice Black believes simply that the commerce clause "means that Congress can regulate commerce and that the
' 21
courts cannot."
The Justice's views in the area of state taxation are consistent with
those in the regulatory area, and a good deal more graphic. As in the
regulatory field, he stands apart from his brothers in rejecting the need
for or wisdom of a broad judicially administered doctrine of pre-emption.
He finds little constitutional language authorizing judicial restrictions
on state legislative authority. His prejudice in favor of legislative primacy
bends him toward accommodating implications from Congressional
silences. And his sympathy is rarely invoked by industry in a court contest between the enacted will of the people and the fiscal interests of commercial enterprises.
As in the area of regulation, the recurrent constitutional issues in
state taxation are whether the law affects interstate commerce at all, if
so whether it "burdens" it, and if so whether it does so unconstitutionally.
In taxation, moreover, there is an additional frequent plea challenging
the jurisdiction of a state legislature to reach the subject of the tax. In
all of these, Justice Black's position appears primarily to be shaped by
a compelling reasoned prejudice in favor of relatively untrammeled
legislative prerogative. In that sense, Justice Black's response to these
issues is reduceable to a single embracive rule with one narrow exception.
Absent overt and outright discrimination against interstate commerce,
the Court is without power to do more than construe express Congressional promulgations on the subject.2 He discounts and discards all of
the familiar spectres of multiple taxation, Balkanization, undue burden,
etc., as mere makeways for judicial expropriation of authority which he
believes the Constitution allocated as an exclusive Congressional province.23
In rejecting these contentions, his responses
as philosophical. 24 To a claim of undue economic
the commercial litigant on the responsibility of
latively determined share of the governmental
them to the political rather than judicial arenas

are as often pragmatic
burdens, he may chide
all to bear their legisenterprise,2 5 directing
for their redress. To a

21. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946). (Interestingly, Black concurred in
this decision which struck a racially discriminating law as a burden on interstate commerce.)
22. See Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 446 (1939): ("[Sltate
laws are not invalid under the Commerce Clause unless they actually discriminate against
interstate commerce or conflict with a regulation enacted by Congress.")
23. E.g., "I think that whether state legislation imposes an 'undue burden' on interstate commerce raises pure questions of policy, which the Constitution intended should be

resolved by Congress." Morgan, supra, note 21 at 387.
24. See J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 et. seq. (1938) for a comprehensive statement of Black's practical perspectives.
25. E.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 444-445 (1939).
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claim raising the spectre of oppressive multiple taxation, he responds by
first discounting the spectre, and follows that pronouncement with a
discourse on the inadequacy and inappropriateness of the judicial process
as an institution for resolution of the complex interest-balancing involved
in all such pleas.26 And even in those cases where his exception of outright discrimination is alleged, he looks long and hard, commencing his
reasoning from his prejudices in favor of legislative resolution and against
judicial rejudgment of those dispositions.
In thirty years on the Court, he has yet to author an opinion which
struck as unconstitutional a state levy under the commerce clause. Only
twice has he joined in decisions which in any way appear to delimit the
state's authority to tax commerce until otherwise commanded by Congress." And even in those instances in which Congress has spoken, he
reasons from an accommodating prejudice which would leave both the
federal and state governments the broadest legislative latitude consistent
with the Congressional expression.28
Once again, it seems important to search for the most essential
prejudices motivating his views. It is not simply antipathy to the pre1937 spectacle of judicially immunizing a commercial enterprise from its
legislatively determined share of the costs of government. Nor does the
basis seem to be his evident preference for regulation and taxation of
business, nor necessarily his apparent faith that legislative dispositions
are superior to the courts in economic affairs. While each of these prejudices do appear deducible from his opinions here and elsewhere, and
may well add force and form to the conclusions he reaches, it is submitted that somewhere along the line a more fundamental prejudice
began to work-that in favor of effectuating the democratic premise of
popular rule.
Black's (and he submits, the Constitution's) faith is initially and
primarily placed in the most comprehensive body politic, the Congress,
and until they clearly act, in the state legislatures as a power reserved
to them. Propelling this conviction is the clear commitment of this
Justice to the essence of the democratic form and reliance upon the
26. Central R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962); Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe
Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
27. Compare Brotherhood of Locomotive Engr's v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 382 U.S.
423 (1966) and Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961) with Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942). See also his view of the foreign commerce area, especially
as related to alcoholic beverages. E.g., Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)
(his dissent to the "original package doctrine") ; Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam
Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 340 (1964); Hostetter v. Idelwild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377
U.S. 324 (1964).
28. While vitriolic in his attacks upon the doctrine, Mr. Justice Black has had little
success in defining it himself. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
277-278 (1964), he proffered the view that its original meaning was "according to the law
of the land." It would seem less than a precise guideline for decision making.
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democratic forums for the adjustment of divergent economic interests, and
he would have that power unrestricted by other than explicit constitutional limitations.
C.

Due Process of Law

Mr. Justice Black's insistence on explicit constitutional limitations
brings us to consideration of the third device employed by the pre-1937
Court as a restraint on legislative authority in the economic arena-the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. However expressly present in the Constitution, the due process
clauses are far from explicit in the usual sense of the word. For what is
"due process of law? '2 Indeed, the task of defining that amorphous
phrase lies at the very heart of the problems connected with it. For our
purposes, it only seems necessary to sketch a broad outline of the definitional content afforded it through judicial usage. That outline reduces the
phrase into three sub-categories, respectively labeled the "substantive,"
"procedural" and "jurisdictional" aspects of due process of law. It was
via substantive and jurisdictional due process that the pre-1937 Court
imposed restraints on economic legislation, and thus it is with those two
aspects that we are here concerned.
The notion of "substantive" due process consists of a presumed duty
of the judiciary to evaluate the substance of legislation in order to determine whether the law is unconstitutional by reason of being arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable or the like. The notion of "jurisdictional" due
process consists of a presumed duty of the judiciary to determine whether
a given state has unfairly or unjustly exceeded its legitimate jurisdiction
in attempting to reach subjects outside its territory or otherwise beyond
its competence as a law-making body. Utilized by judges who were
opposed to legislative involvement in the marketplace, it was not uncommon for such apparently subjective determinations to result in a
conclusion of unconstitutional abridgment of property rights of one sort
or another. But neither was it uncommon to find Justice Black objecting
to both the usage and the results.
His intense distaste for the use of the due process clause as a tool
to immunize business from legislatively enacted taxes or regulations was
illustrated soon after his ascent to the bench. The opportunity came in
a case in which the Court faced a challenge levied by an insurance company against a state tax law under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment." In a blistering dissent, Justice Black declared his
willingness to set aside prior decisions in order to hold that corporations
were not "persons" protected by that amendment and hence not entitled
to the protection against state transgressions of due process standards.
29. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
30. Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5, 15 (1938).
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But the attack was clearly aimed at the wrong target, and Mr. Justice
Black admitted as much by abandoning the argument thereafter. The
frustration of legislation was not being accomplished by the notion of
"persons" but by that broad subjective verbalism, "due process of law."
As employed by the Court, the substantive and jurisdictional aspects of
the concept were translated into only slightly more meaningful euphemisms, such as "reasonable," "just," "fair," to be contrasted with "arbitrary," "capricious." True enough, these phrases had long provided a
basis for resolving disputes between private parties. But in the constitutional field they were being employed to re-weigh interests, re-determine
policy, and re-balance judgments which had previously been so treated by
the legislative (and thus popular) arm of government.
This spectacle deeply disturbed Black both as a Senator and as a
Justice, for it seemed to alter markedly the Constitutional allocation of
decision-making power. "Under our constitutional plan of government,"
he protested in 1938, "the exclusive power of determining the wisdom of
policy rested with the legislature."'" If the Court were allowed to reconsider those determinations, then the constitutional form of government
was being replaced by another, in which "the final determination of the
wisdom and choice of policy has passed from legislators-elected by and
responsible to the people-to the courts. 32
Recognizing this impact, the Justice refused to take comfort in the
fact that the replacement was being effectuated in the name of fine sounding phrases. The phrases, in both the substantive and jurisdictional
context, were hardly replacements for the right of the people to participate as decision-makers in order to effect their desired will. When, in
the case of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,33 the Court composed
a jurisdictional due process requirement of "sufficient minimum contacts
so as not to offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,"
Black wrote a scathing separate opinion despite his concurrence in result.
The opinion is such a clear illustration of his awareness of the real
and potential destructive impact of these vague euphemisms that it is
here set forth in extensive part:
There is strong emotional appeal in the words "fair play,"
"justice," and "reasonableness." But they were not chosen by
those who wrote the original Constitution or the Fourteenth
Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use in invalidating State or Federal laws passed by elected legislative
representatives. No one, not even those who most feared a
democratic government, ever formally proposed that courts
should be given power to invalidate legislation under such an
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 19.
33. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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elastic standard. Express prohibitions against certain types of
legislation are found in the Constitution, and under long-settled
practice, courts invalidate laws found to conflict with them.
This requires interpretation, and interpretation, it is true, may
result in the extension of the Constitution's purpose. But that
is no reason to restrict a State's power to tax and sue those
whose activities affect persons ... within the State .... Superimposing the natural justice concept on the Constitution's specific prohibitions could operate as a drastic abridgment of
democratic safeguards they embody such as freedom of speech,
press and religion, and the right to counsel .... 14
This result, I believe, alters the form of government our Constitution provides. 5
It can be reported that at least part of Justice Black's crusade
against judicial reevaluation of legislative policy decisions has met with
success. Despite the persistence of the "reasonableness" language, the
present accepted application sustains all economic laws from substantive
due process attack in the federal courts unless the Court is unable to
conceive of a rational basis for its enactment, with all presumptions in
favor of the legislature's reasonableness. 6 And while there continues to
be some frustration in his battle against jurisdictional due process, the
pendency of proposed federal legislation in the area of state taxation
appears to suggest that he may yet be vindicated, if only by Congressional fiat.
D.

Summary: Black and Legislative Primacy

It seems appropriate to summarize and briefly assay Justice Black's
response to the tripartite barriers of the pre-1937 Court. Stated affirmatively, the response is singular: effect popular rule via legislative supremacy. From that proposition, the preceding discussion seems to acquire its
fullest meaning. What is the federal commerce power? It is whatever the
national constituency, via Congress, says it is. What is the state province
in commerce? Again, it is primarily a matter for political resolution, first
in the states, and thereafter for Congress where abuses appear to threaten
national interests. What is due process of law? It is a limited assurance
that legislatures and courts will reach their decisions according to approved procedures; it is not laissez-faire economic philosophy. The
unifying consequence is an expansion of popular rule-of democracy.
While it is one thing to generalize stated propositions, it is quite
another to understand the basis for the choice of one proposition as
opposed to another. Clearly, his economic views served as a motivating
34. Id. at 325.
35. Id. at 326.

36. See Hetherington, State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law,
53 N.W.U.L. REv. 13 (1958).
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prejudice. Professor Reich suggests that it took some while for Mr. Black
the Senator to mature into Mr. Black the Justice. Yet matured or not,
his opinions in these early cases were rationalized in terms of democracy,
not economics, and he has not deviated from the rationalization or the
results since that unknown point at which he did mature. Thus, while it
may help us to understand that the Justice who faced these issues was
only briefly separated from the Senator who led the legislative innovators,
that understanding does not preclude the possibility of more philosophical
footing.
The same can be said of other proffered analyses. One of those is
that he is a "State's Rights" advocate. Still another is the view that Justice
Black mistrusts the judiciary at large. Another, and less complimentary,
is the view that Black himself lacks the capacity to deal with the complexities inherent in the Constitutional area of economic rights, and thus
seeks merely to avoid them.
Easily a more acceptable analysis revolves around that prejudice
which I have already characterized as his principal motivation-the
fundamental democratic premise. Given this analysis, that which has
preceded corresponds with that which follows. It is an approach which
seems to make use of all expressions on nearly all of the constitutional issues to which he has responded.
Was Black merely picking any rule that would allow the legislature
maximum sway, simply because he concurred with the notions of the
New Deal and supported the particular legislation? Perhaps so, but
perhaps it was so because of the frustration he experienced as a legislator.
The experience was of knowing the extent to which you were expressing
the desires of your constituents, and knowing how they were being
frustrated by judicial restraints upon your capacity to effect their desires.
It is this sort of perspective that makes Black less a "States' Rights"
advocate than a simple democrat, and it is similarly this perspective that
renders meaningful his vitriolic opposition to infringement upon that
effective democracy by both the Court and the Executive.
In the pages which follow, we will leave Senator Black the Populist
and New Dealer, and swiftly find the Justice who still sits upon our highest courts. He will be examined by way of his responses to two of the
more significant constitutional issues which he has been called upon to
face. Throughout that examination, the recurrent suggested theme is
that he is most markedly a Democrat. By this brief statement, the reader
is invited to test that premise, and, if he likes, to search for another.
IV.

Assuring Legislative Representivity

The commitment to legislative primacy depends, for its validity,
upon faith in the integrity of the legislative forum. In terms of constitutional issues, this premise has produced extensive litigation of major
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proportions in two areas. One of them, discussed in the pages which
follow, concerns the assurance that the legislators, state and federal,
actually represent those in whose names they act. It seems essential to
the American democratic theory that they represent "the people." In fine,
we now breach the area of voting rights.
Mr. Justice Black has shown himself more than willing to obtain
the assurances of representation by "the people." Yet there are many
aspects of assuring representivity, and upon them the Court has been
sharply divided. Indeed, of late, some have suggested that Black has
parted from his former footing-the heinous offense of inconsistency. We
shall have to see. But before beginning examination of the cases themselves, it seems important to offer a few observations about the jungle
into which we tread.
The voting right cases contain an additional bonus for our overall
analysis of Justice Black. At work in each voting case are three of the
prejudices by which Black has found himself strongly influenced. First,
inasmuch as state legislatures are the constitutional repository of most
of the decision-making authority in this area, there is invoked his prejudice in favor of broad latitude for the exercise of this power. Second,
since the cases themselves are pleas for judicial review of legislative
decisions, the corollary prejudice against judicial infringement upon
legislative primacy makes its bid. Third, because deprivation of the right
to vote leads to a perversion of democracy, there is at work what I have
characterized as his most fundamental prejudice, the prejudice in favor
of popular rule. In the process of deciding these cases, therefore, Justice
Black has been forced to choose and weigh these competing prejudices.
His determinations, therefore, reveal much about the primacy of these
values within the framework of his philosophy.
Mr. Justice Black had his first opportunity to deal with voting rights
in 1946. The case was Colegrove v. Green. 7 For the majority, Colegrove
presented only the threshold issue-justiciability. Frankfurter was chosen
to write the Court's opinion, a task he discharged in his classic pose,
denying relief for reasons of precedent and judicial restraint. Malapportionment pleas were said to go beyond the realm of judicial competence,
"because due regard for the effective working of our Government revealed
the issue to be of a peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for
judicial determination. 3 8
Black had a different view of the requirements of an effective Government, which was also a democratic one. In a dissent which previewed
the Court's reversal on the justiciability question, as well as its standard
for almost twenty years, he put aside his prejudices for legislative latitude
and against judicial supervision. For him, the apportionment issue had
37. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
38. Id. at 552.
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to be justiciable, the cases should be resolved in accordance with the
fundamental premise that:
[T]he constitutionally guaranteed right to vote and the right to
have one's vote counted clearly imply the policy that state
election systems, no matter what their form, should be designed
to give approximately equal weight to each vote cast.3 9
Yet it remained for Justice Black to more fully expound upon the
basis of his convictions. His first opportunity to do so came in Wesberry
v. Sanders,40 which, like Colegrove, was a congressional malapportionment case. Writing for the Court, he reaffirmed the standard of constitutionality in language which has become the guidepost for all further
apportionment matters, that "as nearly as is practicable, one man's vote
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's."' 4 ' This

time, he took special pains to explain the reasons for judicial involvement:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of having
a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which,
as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic,
are illusory if the right to vote is undermined. Our Constitution
leaves no room for classification
of people in a way that unneces42
sarily abridges that right.
Those who maintain some familiarity with Supreme Court Reports may
instinctively raise an eyebrow at the concluding sentence of the pronouncement, especially at the use of the term "unnecessarily." A study
of his opinions in the cases which have followed these earliest voting
rights contests reveals the response to be an accurate one.
Justice Black sees more to the problem of assuring representative
government than justiciability and the simplistic mandate of one manone vote. Because of this perspective we are in one of those few areas in
which Black has left the "liberal" fold, much to the befuddlement of those
who have so categorized him. It may prove instructive, therefore, to direct
our attention to the instances of departure and the reasons for them.
The early voting cases presented the single problem of apportionment. In this area the Court is asked to reject as unconstitutional state
systems in which votes of some were given less weight than those of
others. Justice Black's position on this issue concurs with that of a majority, and all of the "liberals" on the Court. It is that there is simply no
acceptable constitutional basis for discrimination between qualified electors by weighting their votes differently. Similarly, Black aligns himself
with the liberal bloc on matters of racially objectionable voting qualifica39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 570.
376 U.S. 1 (1964).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 17-18. (Emphasis added).
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tions. His position here, dictated by the clear mandate of the civil war
amendments, is that race is one consideration which is unequivocally
precluded as a foundation for state exercise of the authority to prescribe
voting qualifications. Hence, upon proof that discrimination is an aim
or effect of a state election law, he is quick to strike the law as unconstitutional.48 Moreover, Justice Black has suggested greater use of the
power granted Congress by the final clauses of the fifteenth and fourteenth amendments as a means to legislatively effect the national goal of
rendering race an irrelevant factor as regards the franchise." But there
are voting issues other than race or weighting which have been presented
to the Court. And it is within those issues that Black has left his assigned
fold.
It may be well to spell out the Constitution's allocation of authority
in the field of prescribing voting qualifications as a prerequisite to the
discussion of these cases. As a power reserved to them, the Constitution
allocates to the states the plenary authority to determine the qualifications for the electors of their own officers. Under the provisions of article
one those same state determinations describe the qualifications of electors of members of the Federal House of Representatives, and the seventeenth amendment extended the reach of those laws to the election of
federal senators. Hence, it is state legislative authority with which we
deal. The limitations on this constitutional power, other than the specific
prohibitions regarding race, religion or sex, are confined to the general
notion of equal protection and the power, however exercised by Congress
under clauses of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, which give it
authority to pass laws deemed appropriate to achieve the objectives of
these amendments. In effect, then, the allocation of authority appears
somewhat of a turnabout of the commerce clause's allocation, with original authority placed in the states subject to certain specified prohibitions,
a general principle of rationality in classification, and the possible enactment of federal legislation to insure that rationality. Indeed, it is clear
that Justice Black treats the issues in a manner which is strikingly
analogous to his efforts as a defender of state legislative authority in the
commerce cases. As in those cases, he can be described as attaching
every presumption of correctness to the exercise of that power by the
states, regarding as somewhat sacrosanct the state prerogatives in the
field, and viewing with undisguised antipathy the Court's effort to employ
as vague a notion as equal protection to invalidate the enacted will of the
states. These attitudes appear to contrast with those of his liberal colleagues, who are far less concerned with the allocation of decision-making
prerogatives than with preserving the "integrity of the franchise" in all
cases. It is a contrast which has led him to part from their familiar ranks,
43. Compare Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) with Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145 (1965) and United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965).
44. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 678-679 (1966).
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as is illustrated by their division over three (or perhaps four) cases; all
appearing within the last few years: Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,4 5 Carrington v. Rash,46 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 7 and Fortson v. Morris.4 s
The twenty-fourth amendment was incorporated into our Constitution on February 4, 1964. Its effect was to prohibit the state imposition
of a poll tax as a prerequisite to voting for federal officials.4 9 It did not
prohibit the states from imposing such a tax as a qualification for the
status of an elector of state or local officials. Soon after that adoption,
however, the Court was called upon to effect that second prohibition in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections."0 Much to Black's amazement and
distaste, a majority of the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas,
assented to the request. The announced ground of the opinion was the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; more specifically,
the conclusion reached was that: "Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is
not germane to one's ability to participate intelligently in the electoral
process."'"
Mr. Justice Black was unwilling to join in this opinion, despite his
expressed personal view that the right to vote should not depend upon
the payment of a poll tax. But he did not see the wisdom of a poll tax as
a major issue of the case. To him the issue was amendment of the Constitution by judicial fiat, and his dissent accordingly struck at the old
problem of judges imposing their own economic and political theories on
legislatures, the problem which he had faced in the commerce cases
three decades before. In view of his evident distaste for the poll tax, the
striking similarity of his dissent in Harper to his opinions in those early
cases goes far to discredit the view that his own economic philosophy was
the motivating force behind his position in those earlier cases.52 Without
45. Id.
46. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
47. 383 U.S. 301 (1965).
48. 385 U.S. 231 (1966).

49. In Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528 (1965), Mr. Justice Black joined in an
opinion lauding the objective of that amendment and securing its effectiveness against an
effort by the State of Virginia to circumvent that objective.
50. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).

51. Id. at 668.
52. Another explanation, of course, and equally plausible is that Black has simply been
caught up in his own methodology, shaped by his early expressions and reactions. This explanation is rendered even more plausible by his recently evidenced tendency in other areas
to reach similarly difficult contradictions between his avowed personal preferences and the
decision required by the application of his adopted methodology. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), discussed above, as well as his approach in El Paso v. Simmons,
379 U.S. 497 (1965). In Griswold his adherence to literalism precluded him from assent to
including "privacy" as a first amendment penumbra despite many prior opinions in which
he clearly endorsed such an interest. In El Paso, his "absolutism" and "literalism" was
somehow applied to the prohibition against laws impairing the obligation of contract, a
result which comports with his methodology but which seems substantively inconsistent
with the preference for legislative latitude which permeates his opinions in all other related

fields.
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totally discrediting the value of the equal protection doctrine in the
hands of the judiciary, he demanded that it be employed with great
deference for enacted expressions of the popular will. Unless the Court
was willing to take the position he regarded as untenable, that there was
no conceivable rational basis for this poll tax qualification, he refused to
regard the wisdom of such a law as subject matter outside the realm of
political resolution.
The propriety of applying this "commerce analogy" to the voting
rights area, whatever the similarity of the judicial-legislative conflict,
need be examined with regard to the problems peculiar to voting. It is
one thing to refer grievances regarding economic legislation to political
forums; it is quite another to deny judicial supervision as regards the
franchise. Reference to the alternative of political redress has a hollow
sound for the disenfranchised, for the essence of their grievance is the
unavailability of that redress. In light of that perspective, it is suggested
that judicial supervision is required if Black's principles are to be meaningful. Yet the thrust of this argument is not of equal force in every
case. In Harper, for instance, no one was permanently effected by this
tax, nor was any racial animus shown to be effected by its imposition. So
long as it presented no such invidious, forbidden overtone, political
resolution of its wisdom or propriety remains an acceptable alternative.
A different case was presented in Carrington v. Rash,5" a case in which
Black himself utilized the equal protection clause to strike a state qualification. The abusive qualification he saw in Carringtonwas that a different standard was used to measure the residence requirements of
military personnel, as opposed to other "residents." The principal basis
of Justice Black's objection was that the law was aimed at precluding
participation by the relatively transient military residents, because it was
believed they would take a "wrong" view of the needs of the communities
wherein they resided. 4
There is at least a superficial inconsistency between Carringtonand
Harper. And yet, somehow, it seems an understandable inconsistency if
we keep in mind the nature of the abuses in each. The poll tax was capable
of resolution by those injured by the qualification; the manipulation of
residence requirements was not. In terms of Black's desire to accomodate
the interests in open franchise with latitude for the legislative branch,
Harperand Carringtonseem to present an appropriate point of difference.
More difficult to fit into the general Black framework is his decision
in the recent "Georgia Governor" case. 5 Viewed as a voting case, it is
difficult to justify election of a minority governor by a malapportioned
53. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
54. There are two interesting observations. First, there is the first amendment overtone
of the objection. The other is that this very objection, the views of the aggrieved targets of
the law serving as a basis for the law, was proffered by Justice Black as one acceptabl*
rational basis in the poll tax case.
55. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
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legislature. That was the claim of the litigants, and seemingly the view
taken by the minority of the Court which included the liberal bloc. But it
was not the view taken by Black in two respects. First, he directed the
Court to its own holding that the legislature in question was apportioned
constitutionally; secondly, he simply stated that it was not a "voting
case." If anything, his decision stands for the proposition that Governors
need not be directly elected by the people. As such it implies an interesting
modification of Black's adherence to the democratic premise: it implies
that he regards democracy as adequately assured by preserving legislative
integrity. This is an implication somewhat consonant with a perspective
of the Executive branch which he evinced some years earlier in the
"steel seizure" case,5" but it seems directly at odds with his position in
Gray v. Sanders.5 7 Despite the timeliness and greater applicability of
Gray, I tend to believe that if he had to choose between those two
opinions, he would retract Gray. But since he need not face that choice,
the surmise remains little more than that.
The final touchstone for discussion in the voting area is the dissenting opinion Justice Black authored in South Carolinav. Katzenbach.58
In many ways, it is one of his most revealing pronouncements. It is his
strongest expression relating to the proper status of the states in our
federal system; it seems to indicate his typically stringent repudiation
of judicial supervision of legislation; and yet, at the same time his approach to the issue seems, in effect, a repudiation of that very notion as
he has most often enunciated it.
The case arose as an attack levied by the state of South Carolina
against federal voting rights legislation. The Court approved the legislation in its entirety, but Justice Black withheld his approval in two respects. His first objection was that the Court enunciated the wrong
ground for ascertaining that the coverage formula of the Act was constitutional. Said the Justice, "I do not base my conclusion on the fact that
the coverage formula is rational, for it is enough for me that Congress
by creating this formula has exercised its hitherto unquestioned and undisputed power to decide when and where, and upon what conditions
its laws shall go into effect." 59 The familiar tone of that pronouncement,
56. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-89 (1952):
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws
are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he
thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make the laws which the President is to
execute. The first section of the first article says that 'All legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States***' .... The Founders
of this Nation entrusted the law making power to the Congress alone in both good
and bad times. It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of
power and the hopes for freedom that lay behind their choice.
57. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
58. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
59. Id. at 356.
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however, was followed by a glimpse at a side of Justice Black hitherto
undisclosed.
One section of the law required states who came within its coverage
to seek federal judicial or adminstrative approval of any law or constitutional amendment affecting voting. Of the two objections he posed to this
provision, easily the most compelling for him was the import it had for
Black's view of federalism. In his view, the effect of that provision was
"to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution between state and
federal power almost meaningless." 60 It was the demeaning method employed here which Black most strenuously objected to. "A federal law
which assumes the power to compel the states to submit in advance any
proposed legislation they have for approval of federal agents approaches
dangerously near to wiping out the States as useful and effective units in
the government of our country." 6' 1
The conclusion he reached is not half as significant as the method
he employed in getting there. For language, he turned to the Republican
form guarantee and the ninth amendment's reservation of certain powers
to the states, both of which represent the very class of vague provisions
against whose use he has so violently reacted. Moreover, his discussion
goes far to convince a reader that the same result would have been
reached without either of these provisions. Consider this paragraph:
I see no reason to read into the Constitution meaning it did not
have when it was adopted and which have not been put into it
since. The proceedings of the original Constitutional Convention show beyond all doubt that the power to veto or negative
state laws was denied Congress. .

. The refusal to give Con-

gress this extraordinary power to veto state laws was based on
the belief that if such power resided in Congress the62 States
would be helpless to function as effective governments.
It was precisely this type of judicial decision making that Justice
Black so violently and eloquently opposed in the commerce area. The
opinion prompts one to ask the Justice whether he is the same Justice
who insists on express provisions, who repudiates implied historical
readings of vague provisions, who is irritated when confronted with a
colleague reading his personal preferences into the Constitution as a
restraint on legislative decision-making. Certainly his own opinion in
this case is fraught with all these devices.
For such a spectacle, it is submitted, there is but one explanation.
We see in South Carolina v. Katzenbach a deeply motivating prejudice
of Mr. Justice Black in favor of a more complementary federalism, a
prejudice for an actual partnership rather than a chain of command.
60. Id. at 358.
61. Id. at 360.
62. Id. at 360.
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That the prejudice is revealed for us to see in a "voting case" is perhaps the best proof of the observation that, once again, voting cases for
some on the Court are not merely voting cases for Justice Black. For
while he is vitally committed to assuring the "demos" of democracy, he
is no less committed to preserving the Constitutional structure within
which our forefathers felt democracy would best prevail. It is this duality
of commitment which is clearly one of the principal elements of his approach to the task of building a philosophy of American constitutional
democracy.
V. ASSURING THE CAPACITY FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT
Surpassing both in pagination and impact his efforts in all other
areas of constitutional law is Justice Black's work in the field of our
political liberties. 3 Interestingly, the area is one of the few aspects of
his overall approach to constitutional issues which has shown a marked
alteration and growth over the years. Yet the alteration was not so
marked that the historian Charles Beard was precluded from ranking
the Justice in 1945 "even above Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis in
the record of judicial resistance to government encroachments on the
' As an effort to trace the
liberties of press and speech." 64
evolution of his
views has already been ably made by Professor Charles Reich,"' the
primary goal of the discussion which follows is an evaluation of the
current posture of his convictions in the area of political liberty.
It is difficult to present an adequate condensation of this area. Political liberty has so many aspects, so inextricably interrelated, that some
attempt to structure the discussion need be made lest our analysis degenerate into meaningless perambulation. Accordingly, Mr. Justice
Black's philosophy in these respects will be developed as responses to
three fundamental questions about the judicial protection afforded the
varied parts of this constitutional labyrinth. First, What are the interests
and activities which should be protected? Second, What should be the
degree of the protection afforded the various interests? Third, From
what infringements and abridgements should they be protected?
A. Defining the ProtectedLiberties
Evaluation of the political interests and activities which should be
protected would seem best begun by an evaluation of the purpose Justice
Black regards as underlying the relevant constitutional provisions. There
63. Mr. Justice Black's efforts in this area are discussed and evaluated more frequently
than any other aspect of his service on the Court. For those who are interested, many of
the important opinions and articles relevant to this section have been collected in I. DLLARD,
ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDOm (1964). See also Gordon, Justice Hugo Black-First
Amendment Fundamentalist,20 LAW. GuiLD REV. 1 (1960).
64. As discussed in Gordon, Mr. Justice Black at 70, 16 LAW. GumD REV. 102, 103
(1956).
65. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARv. L. REV. 673 (1963).

This study, by the Justice's former law clerk, now a professor at Yale Law School, embraces nearly all of Mr. Black's work in an effort to trace his "evolution."
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are two approaches to this question, each with some distinct significance,
yet generally overlapping. One approach is to regard all express and
interpreted negatives on government authority as a commitment to individual freedom. In this respect, we fall into that line of expressions characterizing ours as a free society. This section of the paper, however,
draws upon the more limited category of "political liberties."
The term "political liberty" represents a purposeful sub-categorization
of some of the liberties assured by the constitutional negatives. It also
represents a second approach to our inquiry, an approach which Justice
Black apparently regards as allowing for the more central significance
of certain of our safeguards. The additional political facet constitutes
a modification of the free society generalization and introduces us to a
perspective which Mr. Black shares with a majority of the present
Court,66 although he would extend the political adjective further than
most of his colleagues.
The central theme of this perspective is its attempt to functionally
relate the areas of activity set apart by the negative commands of the
first amendment to the democratic premise upon which our nation rests.
Hence it is not an attempt to limit the significance of these or other
guarantees as assurances of personal freedom from potential "nonpolitical" abuses of government, but an attempt to more fully effect their
intended scope wherever there is sensed a functional relationship between
the activities protected and the capacity of the people to govern themselves. The consequences which flow from this perspective are multifold.
One is that the political liberties are given a "preferred position"6 7 as
regards the other assurances of the Bill of Rights in that it leads to different standards of measuring the public interests in delimiting certain
activities. Perhaps the most graphic illustration of the distinction between
this preferred position and the more generalized view of all of the negatives as conditions conducive to a free society is offered by the recent
attempts to adjust the law of libel to the needs of self-government.6 8 In
this area, the use of the political sub-category is leading the Court to
restrict the scope of the libel action as it effects political discussion without any correlative restriction where political ramifications are absent.
The gist of Justice Black's perspective was presented in Milkwagon
Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.:
[I] view the guarantees of the First Amendment as the
foundation upon which our governmental structure rests and
66. See generally an article by Justice Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meikle-

john Interpretationof the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1965).
67. For a thorough critique of the "preferred position" notion, see P. FREUND, THE
60-87 (1965).
68. E.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75
(1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S.
564 (1959). See also Beauharnas v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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without which it could not continue to endure as conceived and
planned. Freedom to speak and write about public questions is
as important to the life of our government as is the heart to the
human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened,
the result is debilitation; if it
69
be stilled, the result is death.
The import of this perspective goes well beyond recitation of melodramatic metaphors. For Justice Black, it is a charge to be ever sensitive to
any limitations, however sophisticated, imposed upon those aspects of
liberty assured by the Constitution which relate to the political processes.
This charge is ever the more compelling for him in light of his expressed
conviction that:
The area set off for individual freedom by the Bill of Rights
was marked by boundaries precisely defined. It is my belief that
the area so set off provides adequate minimum protection for the
freedoms so indispensable to individual liberty. Thus we have
only
to observe faithfully the boundaries already marked for
70
US.

These then are the interests which Justice Black believes should
be protected. There is the general interest in individual freedom, and
then, super-imposed, both in scope and degree, there is the heightened
interest of a people committed to the principle of government by popular
will. 7 1 The extent of that heightened interest is best explained by progressing into a discussion of the activities he has sought to protect by
interpretation and exposition.
When Black prepared himself for service on the Court, he spent
much of his time reading history. The lessons of that body of knowledge
led him along much the same path in responding to cases involving first
amendment freedoms as he took in the area of legislative supremacy.
For history demonstrated to him that great mischief would and could be
done by a judiciary which conceeded the liberties on the one hand, but
reserved the right to reinterpret their substance or balance their implications on the other.
Thus it is that the great bulk of his efforts have been against the
intricacies of judicial craftsmanship. In this view he was aided greatly
by the simplistic nature of the first amendment's language. Believing
the choice of language to have been deliberate, he resists at every turn
69. Milkwagon Drivers' Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301-302
(1941).

70. Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 444-45 (1961).
71. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958), he wrote:
"We should never forget that the freedoms secured by that Amendment-Speech,
Press, Religion, Petition and Assembly-are absolutely indispensable for the preservation of a free society in which government is based upon the consent of an informed
citizenry ....

"
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efforts to read into it any qualifications as well as efforts to read
substance out of it by definition. No law abridging the freedoms means
just that to Justice Black, and the freedoms themselves-speech, press
and petition-carry no less force.
Moreover, he refuses to be lulled into agreement based upon notion
that definitional limitations obstensibly unrelated to political liberty are
any less an evil. More than once he has pointed to historical examples in
an effort to demonstrate that such exceptions have all to often become the
rule. Clearly in this category is his adamant refusal to go along with
efforts, early and recent, which would allow censorship of any kind rooted
in what he considers the illusive theory that such expressions ought to be
considered beyond the Constitution's protection for reasons of their
alleged "obscenity." In fact, his position on this point has led him to
refuse even to evaluate the content of allegedly obscene material when
that issue is presented to the Court. The many reasons for his position
and practice in this area invites our first analysis of one of the major
contributions he has made to thought in this area of constitutional lawthe notion of first amendment"2 literal "absolutes."
Justice Black's notion of liberal absolutism includes two implications
of major significance. One of them, primarily his literalism, is present in
our immediate quest for definitions of the area protected as political
liberty. The other, primarily the absolutism, speaks more fully to the
task of determining the degree of the protection, discussed more fully in
the next subsection of this paper. For the purposes of both, it appears
important to understafid that part of Mr. Justice Black's reasoning which
has led him to espouse this absolutist position. 73 While any such attempt
is admittedly a risky proposition, an effort in that direction is nonetheless proffered in hopes of laying a meaningful foundation for the discussion which is to follow.
Ours is a governmental arrangement premised first and foremost
upon democratic rule. But in terms of our liberties, that initial commitment can cut two ways, both paths leading from the notion of popular
rule itself. Popular government seems in large part premised upon the
hope that an informed, intelligent electorate is competent to order the
responsibilities of both the individual and the whole of society. Thus
wisdom, especially political wisdom, must be defined as that which a
majority of the participating electorate determine to be the best course
of conduct through the processes of the political forum: exposure to information and ideas; debate and individual evaluation of those ideas;
and finally, periodic conclusions manifested through the balloting proc72. As previously indicated, the literal-absolute method has recently been applied, perhaps out of a desire for consistency, to the prohibition of the impairment of obligations of
contract clause, triggered by the term "no law." See El Paso v. Simmons, note 52 supra.
73. See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 865 (1960).
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ess. 74 It must be recognized, therefore, that this premise requires the
continued vitality of this political process. How then, are we to be assured
of this continuation? An unequivocal commitment to democracy, "absolute democracy," if you will, would delegate this responsibility to the
people themselves. Indeed, this would appear to have been a path initially permitted by the Constitutional authors. But that choice was expressly rescinded by the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, which, inter
alia, restricted the power of the people by withholding from their Congress
the power to pass any law abridging freedom of speech, press, assembly
or petition. Justice Black clearly believes that this decision was a wise
one. It was reached, he believes, in light of the historical context of
governmental abuses which led to the formation of the colonies and the
nation, and reflected an additional "frank recognition" of the "common
human characteristics" 7 which made unequivocal democracy, in Rosseau's words, "unsuitable for men."
The same reasons which lead Justice Black to approve of the first
amendment as a limitation on the reach of democratic rule leads him to
seek a policy and tools which might best assure the effective permanency
of the political processes upon which that rule is based. The principle
of those reasons are repeatedly illustrated by his opinions in these cases.
The illustrations most typically consist of allusions to the human frailities,
and historical illustrations of the political intolerance which is likely to
flow from that frailty, if it is unchecked. His individualistic response to
this challenge has been to insist upon the broadest construction of the
language of the first amendment consistent with its ordinary meaning,
an approach which has led others to use the term "literal absolutes" as
a description of his approach.
We return, then, to the task of defining the interest and activities
which should be protected by the first amendment. Prior to our attempt
to develop the rationale underlying the absolutist theory, we were involved in a discussion of the obscenity issue. It is an appropriate focus
to continue our examination, for the area seems to contain almost every
major manifestation of the prejudices from which he reasons in the first
amendment area.
When applying the prohibitions against interference with freedom
of speech and press in obscenity cases, he is typically found recanting
74. In United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 114 (1947), he
wrote:

Our political system, different from many others, rests on the foundation of a
belief in rule by the people-not some, but all the people. . . .In a country whose
people elect their leaders and decide great public issues, the voice of none should
be suppressed-at least such is the assumption of the First Amendment. That
amendment, unless I misunderstand its meaning, includes a command that the
Government must, in order to promote its own interest, leave the people at
liberty to speak their own thoughts about government, advocate their own favored
governmental causes, and work for their own political candidates and parties.
75. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 198 (1958).
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the historical abuses to which the notion of obscenity has been subject.
The first and paramount abuse inheres in the term itself. What is obscenity? Justice Murphy, it will be recalled, assured us of two things:
that the area was "well-defined and narrowly limited,"76 and that obscenity was one aspect of speech which was without significant social
value. The cases, as Black is swift to point out, repudiate both assurances. In the recent Mishkin,77 Fanny Hill,78 Ginzberg,79 debacle, both

of these assurances provided the focus of Justice Black's attention:
Whether a particular treatment of a particular subject is with
or without social value in this evolving, dynamic society of
ours is a question upon which no uniform agreement could
possibly be reached among politicians, statesmen, professors,
philosophers, scientists, religious groups or any other type of
group. 0
My conclusion is that certainly after fourteen separate opinions
handed down in these three cases today, no person, not even
the most learned judge, much less a layman, is capable of
knowing . .. whether certain material comes within the area

of "obscenity" ..."
Moreover, he has demonstrated in other opinions that much the same can
be said about nearly every other category that the Murphy opinion or
others would have excluded from the ordinary literal definition of the
categories of speech and press. For Black, the lesson is clear. There can
be no exclusions from these freedoms for reasons of their content. More
importantly, this lesson has led him to redefine the direction of his search
for a preserving policy. For given the performance of the judiciary, the
problem which he sees is not merely to find effective safeguards to protect these liberties in the courts; the need is equally great that the safeguards protect us from the courts. The intended thrust of the first
amendment was to preserve the integrity of the political processes against
all assaults, not merely to substitute the Courts for the Congress as the
appropriate body to preside over its demolition.82 In Konigsberg v. State
Bar8 he explained:
76. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
77. Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).
78. Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
79. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
80. Id. at 480.
81. Id. at 480-81.
82. Indeed he expressed the view in Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 445 (1961),
that the intended effect of the first amendment was to forbid,
any agency of the Federal Government-be it legislative, executive or judicialto harass or punish people for their beliefs, or for their speech about, or public
criticism of, laws and public officials. The Founders of this Nation were not then
willing to trust the definition of First Amendment freedoms to Congress or this
Court, nor am I now. History and the affairs of the present day show the Founders
were right.
83. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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Judges, like everyone else, vary tremendously in their choice of
values. This is perfectly natural, and indeed unavoidable. But
it is neither natural or unavoidable in this country for the
fundamental rights of the people to be dependent upon the different emphasis different judges put on different values at different times. For those rights, particularly the First Amendment
rights involved here, were unequivocally set out by the Founders in our Bill of Rights in the very plainest of language, and
they should not be diluted by "tests" that obliterate them whenever particular judges think values they most highly cherish
outweigh the values most cherished by the Founders.8
Yet all the allusions in the world to the intended breadth of the
original language and its "plain" meaning cannot ipso facto resolve the
question of their meaning. Unless another legal system is desired, judges
must perform that task. All that Justice Black can hope to do is to tender
his understanding of the original plain meaning of the political freedoms,
and hope for the adoption of his definitional outlines as the reigning law.
This he has certainly done.
The term speech, argues Justice Black, was chosen to assure the
vitality of our political form, and hence it should be read so as to preclude any qualification on speech which turns upon the content of the
expression. The first amendment prohibits any exceptions contingent
upon the social value of the expression. His position is that the guarantee
of free speech assures the absolute freedom of any citizen or group to
say or think anything. A similar interpretive gloss is urged by him for
the protection of press, assembly and petition. And the reason for this
gloss is that he trusts no one, including the Justices of the Court, to
effectively limit the destructive impact of erstwhile "well-defined and
narrowly limited" exclusions from this unequivocal construction of these
terms. This position is not, I submit, evidence that he has abandoned
the functional classification of preferred political freedoms; instead it
is evidence of his belief that the task of policing the line between that
which is political and that which has no political or social value bears
tragic potential for those who depend upon the wisdom of an informed,
intelligent electorate for legislative policy.
It is not that he deems all speech to be socially valuable; rather it
is that the very existence of excluded categories presents unavoidable
potential for abuse. Hence, he would recognize no exclusions whatsoever.
And thus, the activities which he thinks must be protected include the
obscene, not because obscenity has or does not have social value, but
because the category can, and historically has, resulted in abusive expansion. For the same reason every type of political discussion, no matter
how hatefully disloyal or inflammatory, is protected. And this definitional
84. Id. at 75.

19681

HUGO L. BLACK

policy applies whether the expressions proposed revolution,8 5 racial
8 7
hatred,88 or alleged subversion.

In the continuing line of cases concerning those laws by which the
States and the Congress attempted to legislate away the Communists,
his position has been eloquent repudiation of both the effort and the
rationale upon which it rests:
I believe the abridgement of liberty here, as in most of the
other cases in that line, is based upon nothing more than the
fear that the American people can be alienated from their allegiance to our form of government by the talk of zealots for a
form of government that is hostile to everything for which
this now stands or ever has stood. I think this fear is groundless. .

. It was [an opposite] kind of faith in the American

people that brought about the adoption of the First Amendment, which was expressly designed to let people say what
they wanted about the government-even against the government if they were so inclined. The idea underlying this then
revolutionary idea of freedom was that the Constitution had
set up a government so favorable to individual liberty that
arguments against the government would fall harmless at the
feet of a satisfied and happy citizenship. 88
And, he adds a pragmatic warning, born of his sensitive awareness of
the cruel lessons of history:
[T]he Framers thought (and I agree) that... we cannot take
away the liberty of groups whose views most people detest without jeopardizing the liberty of all others whose views, though
popular today, may themselves be detested tomorrow.89
The policy and tools he employs to define the protected activities
are easy to summarize. Under no circumstance will Black admit any
definitional exceptions based upon the content of the expression. Speech
is protected, and speech means all speech, hence the description "literal absolutes." Yet at times he goes further than his literalism would
suggest. Given a capacity to fit an activity into the ambit of the terms
speech, press, assembly, or petition, he has assented to numerous decisions which provide a protective cloak for the penumbra essential to
their exercise. Hence he has agreed that the right to free speech must
include the right to remain silent where the response would effect an
abridgment for reason of what would be said. Likewise, speech must
85. See, e.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 'U.S. 82 (1961).
86. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
87. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961)
and Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
88. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 77-78 (1961).
89. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 518-519 (1964).
90. Barenblatt, supra note 86, at 140.
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include the right to hear what others have to say, and it includes the
right to gather together in associations for the purposes of discussion."
The right to publish, includes the right to circulate the publication, 2
the right to distribute it,9" and there is a right in the recipient to receive
publications9 4 regardless of the content of the published expression.
Moreover, Justice Black recognizes all manner of first amendment "interests" in the activities, such as picketing,9" which are described as
demonstrable activity. In brief, the interests as defined by Justice Black
are as broad as the language of the first amendment would appear to
permit.
Nonetheless, there are limits to the activities which Mr. Justice
Black is willing to recognize as either first amendment activities or their
protected penumbra. Recently this sense of limitation led him to dissent
from his liberal colleagues in Griswold v. Connecticut.6 Brief attention
to this case offers an interesting grasp of the texture of his approach in
this area, for his dissenting opinion summarizes the prejudices from
which Justice Black operates while defining the protected liberties. In
an opinion which surprised many of his admirers, he rejected the majority's addition of a right of privacy to the ennumerated freedoms of
the first amendment. With the indulgence of the reader, several portions of his dissent are quoted below in an effort to better convey the
essence of his approach to the task of defining the liberties upon which
we depend:
One of the most effective ways of diluting or expanding a constitutionally guaranteed right is to substitute for the crucial word
or words, words more or less flexible and more or less restricted
in meaning. . . . I have expressed the view many times that
First Amendment freedoms, for example, have suffered from
a failure of the courts to stick to the simple language of the
First Amendment in construing it, instead of invoking multitudes of words substituted for those the Framers used.97
[It is stated] without proof satisfactory to me, that in making
decisions on this basis judges will not consider "their personal
or private notions." One may ask how they can avoid considering them. Our Court certainly has no machinery with which to
take a Gallup poll. . . Is I realize that many good and able
men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhap91. Communist Party, supra note 86.
92. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 650 (1951).

93.

Id.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 77 (1944).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 509.
Id. at 518.
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sodical strains, about the duty of this 'Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this Court
is charged with a duty to make those changes. For myself, I
must with all deference reject that philosophy. The Constitution
makers knew the need for change and provided for it. Amendments suggested by the people's elected representatives can be
submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification.
That method of change was good for our Fathers, and being
somewhat old-fashioned, I must add it is good enough for me.99
Surely, nothing more need be said about the approach of Justice
Black to the task of defining the language used to describe our political
liberties.
B.

Defining the Degree of Protection

Having examined the definitional aspect of Justice Black's approach to political liberty, it now is possible to begin an examination
into the questions of degree. Stated in the negative, to what extent, if
any, does Justice Black agree that political expression sometimes goes
too far?
Much of his response to that question is revealed by the label commonly assigned to his first amendment philosophy-absolutism. Yet that
revelation may convey too much. Perhaps we had best ask, absolute as
compared to what? There are several answers to that query and each
of them deserves some examination.
In its most frequent usage, the term "absolute" is an attempt to
dramatize the contrast between the problem-solving technique utilized
by Justice Black and the various balancing tests with which the Court
continues to resolve the conflict of interest which everyone, Black included, admits to inhere in the questions involving the first amendment
liberties. For despite the categorical fashion in which Mr. Black rejects
the balancing technique, it is submitted that he necessarily engages in
such pursuits, albeit under differently labeled devices.
The accuracy of this proposition will best be tested by a step by
step comparison of the two approaches as they are used in resolving
similar categories of problems. The problems of which I speak seem most
effectively analyzed by utilizing the Court's balancing framework as the
basis for structuring our discussion. This is best begun by attempting to
identify the interests which might be balanced by the Court in determining the degree of protection which should be afforded freedom of expression in various situations.
Easily the focus of most of the conflict between Justice Black and
99. Id. at 522.
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his brethren are the cases involving restraints on the freedom of political
discussion. For much the same reasons which we have examined regarding due process in the economic area, equal protection in the voting area,
and literalism in the definition of political liberty, Justice Black has
violently protested against the device of interest-balancing as a means
of judicially determining the degree of protection which should be
afforded the political liberties. Simply stated, he is as unwilling to trust
judges in this area as in any other, in fact more so. And in view of the
emotionally-laden context in which most abridgments of political expression occur, his reasoning seems all the more persuasive. 10 Accordingly
he has opposed the right of the judicial balancing as a violation of the
literally unequivocal command of the first amendment. Again, it is not
that he suggests that balancing of competing interests is alien to the field
of political expression; rather it is his position that the authors of the
first amendment did all the balancing that is to be done in this area.'
Indeed, in light of his conviction that the preservation of a vibrant public
forum is the indispensable prerequisite to our continued existence as a
democratic nation, and given his further declared belief that the first
amendment provides only the absolute minimum assurances required for
that preservation, it would be unthinkable for Black to say otherwise.
And yet there are cases to resolve. How are they resolved by the
balancers? At the outset, it is essential to identify the interests which
they weigh against the interest of preserving the public forum. For
purposes of our analysis, it seems possible to delineate three general
categories of expressions presenting interests which may be urged as
outweighing the interest in freedom of expression in an attempt to limit
the extent of its protection: (1) expressions said to inflict private injury;
(2) expressions deemed offensive to the public; and (3) expressions which
allegedly threaten peace and order. It is to be noted, at the outset, that
these categories are listed in inverted order of their ostensible importance
to political expression. Hopefully this arrangement will add to, rather
than detract from, the development of an understandable analysis.
100. In Barenblatt, supra note 86, at 151, he wrote:
History should teach us then, that in times of high emotional excitement minority
parties and groups which advocate extremely unpopular social or governmental
innovations will always be typed as criminal gangs and attempts will be made to
drive them out. It was knowledge of this fact, and of its great dangers, that
caused the Founders of our land to enact the First Amendment as a guarantee that
neither Congress nor the people would do anything to hinder or destroy the capacity
of individuals and groups to seek converts and votes for any cause, however radical
or unpalatable their principles might seem under the accepted notions of the time.
101. Black's absolute literalism, therefore, has a dual application. The liberties themselves, i.e., speech, press, are broadly and literally construed. In addition, the prohibition on
Congress stated in terms of ". . . no law. . . " is similarly given unequivocal interpretative
effect. In general usage the notion of absolutism is used to describe the negative sweep of
the first amendment more than the literal definition of the protected liberties. In the text
discussion which has preceded and which follows, however, the absolute literalism of Justice
Black is treated as having equal force for both applications. See generally, Black, The Bill
of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 865 (1960).
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1.

PRIVATELY INJURIOUS EXPRESSIONS

It should be immediately apparent that major definitional problems
are presented by the category of political expressions which may be said
to inflict private injury. Some of them, like the private/public, political/
non-political, distinctions, are concededly beyond accurate definition.
Others, such as identifying the types of political expression which may
fall within this category, are only slightly less difficult. As a result, here
and elsewhere, it will be the practice to avoid these potentially interminable difficulties by selecting illustrations from actual cases which seem
to fall within the general outlines of each category.
Accordingly, it would seem appropriate to consider the recent libel
cases in this category, for the interest there urged as a factor to be
weighed against the interest in publishing harmful statements is that of
securing the object of the remark from its injurious impact. The paradigm
is New York Times v. Sullivan."°2 In weighing the interests in that case,
a far more protectively minded bench than those we will subsequently
examine determined that the interests of society in assuring intelligent
self-government require that a conditional privilege be afforded to expressions critical of the conduct of public officials, despite demonstrable legal
injury inflicted upon the object of the alleged libelous expressions. For
the Court, the extent of the protection to be afforded was determined by
a balancing accommodation of the conflicting interests, and the balance
was struck by qualifying the privilege with a test of "malice." Although
the decision represented an expansion of previous protection afforded
in this area, Justice Black was not satisfied. True to his absolutist label
he wrote, "An unconditional right to say what one pleases about public
affairs is what I consider to be the minimum guarantee of the First
Amendment."' °3 It is a position from which he has continued to operate
throughout the subsequent libel cases. 0 4 In one sense, by expanding
markedly the application of the rule to "public affairs" as well as officials,
the Court has extended its view of the scope of the public interest, but it
has as yet not shown itself willing to make the privilege an absolute one.
Other than the cases involving demonstrable conduct on or near
private property (e.g., picketing, sit-ins, door-to-door solicitation), which
are, for explained reasons, treated separately, the only other cases in
which public injury is the interest balanced against the interest of expression have instead turned on the presence or absence of any public
interest which need be weighed against the private injury. The Chaplinsky
categories, supra, afford the best illustration. There, it will be recalled, the
102. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
103. Id. at 297.
104. Indeed, in both Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 95 (1966) and Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 398 (1967), he reviewed his insistence on the absolute, unconditional protection
he feels required by both the language and object of the First Amendment.
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enumerated categories of expression were held totally outside the constitution's protections, not because of any balance struck, but because
the Court recognized no societal interest in such expressions to balance
against their injurious effect.
In this sense what the Chaplinsky case demonstrates is that the
balancing approach is itself dependent upon definitional judgments, albeit
definitions of interests rather than of constitutional phraseology. The
lesson is not lost on Justice Black, for it is precisely that aspect of the
balancing approach against which he directs the great bulk of his criticism. Thus when I suggested previously that he might dissent from
Chaplinsky were it presented to him today, that was a conclusion principally predicated upon his since-developed conviction that the Court is
not to be trusted with these most precarious tasks of definitions. To rephrase the taxation maxim, he sees in the power to define the power to
destroy.
And yet there are differences in defining interests and weighing
them, as compared to defining the liberties themselves, and those differences are reflected in some limited qualification of Black's antipathy to
this aspect of the Court's methodology. Thus, it may be observed, he
has not suggested that all libel law be deemed per se unconstitutional,
but only as that body of law which relates to the discussion of "public
affairs" despite the poignant definitional problems of the public/private
variety. Similarly, he might well assent to the Chaplinsky exception for
"fighting words," but the important understanding is that whether he
would do so would probably be determined by his willingness to trust the
Court to determine when and where there was an absence of any "social
value." Fittingly, this understanding serves as an appropriate introduction
into the second category of cases.
2.

PUBLICLY OFFENSIVE EXPRESSIONS

We here consider a second category of claims which have been urged
as justifications for limiting the degree of protection afforded political
expression. Two comments seem suggested by the label assigned to this
category. First, the fact that the interests urged in support of restraint
are "public" distinguishes this category, if only by degree, from the first.
Second, the category is described in terms of "offensiveness" because the
word was thought to aptly subsume all of the purported public interests
which may support restraint short of the interest in preserving order
(which is the category examined under the next heading). Having
tendered these explanations, it seems best to begin discussion by inquiry
into the nature of the interests which are included in this category.
The word offensive is perhaps too mild to accurately convey the
emotional context which so frequently accompanies, if not generates,
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the plea for restraints upon expression. It is most typically the true
believer who is found advocating the suppression-of thoughts he deems
subversive, the indignant mothers who press for the imposition of their
morality, the incensed minority group who would outlaw offensive references to their number. These are the champions and the temperaments
which have most often forced the Court to determine the extent to which
public sentiment can be allowed to enlist official support for the promotion or preservation of some ideas at the expense of others. Whatever
the Court's approach, Justice Black has a ready and unwavering response
for all such pleas. Whether the offending expression produces annoyance
or great indignation, whether it engenders mere dislike or deep hatred,
whether the opposition to it be from a few or the view of many, no
interest of this nature can justify the slightest dimunition of the absolute
protection commanded by the language of the first amendment. °5 It is
only actual disturbance of public order triggered by the expression, not
the response of the audience that marks the line for Justice Black.
This was not always the view taken by Mr. Justice Black. In the
early years of his tenure on the Court he was willing, for instance, to
uphold the power of the government to condition its employment upon
the political views of the applicant.0 6 Yet he has since made it more
than clear that no such device nor any other restraint can pass muster
10 7
under his present view of the requirements of a democratic society.
He has reached this position as a consequence of at least three factors.
One factor, undoubtedly rendered even more compelling as a result of
his experiences during the McCarthy era, is his ever-present prejudice
against entrusting the Court with any unnecessary latitude in the first
amendment area. So much has already been said about the force of this
prejudice in the development of his approach to other questions that the
point will not be belabored further. Nor does it seem necessary to spend
more than a few sentences in an effort to fix the likely thrust of this
prejudice in cases in which the Court itself phrases the issue in terms of
the degree of protection. Unless the response to that issue is absolute,
the liberty of expression, which he has characterized as assuring the
"life-giving and life-preserving qualities" 08 essential to our form of
government, are dependent upon nothing more or less than the inclination
and capacity of five Justices to resist the moods of intolerance and emotion which so typically serve as the setting for the cases. In light of the
Court's performance, he reads this alternative as requiring the nation "to
105. Thus in Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 442 (1961), he declared, "Liberty,
to be secure for any, must be secure for all-even for the most miserable merchants of
hatred and unpopular ideas."
106. Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
107. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Adler v. Bd. of Education, 342 U.S.
485 (1952) ; cf., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
108. Braden, supra note 104, at 444.
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sit complacently by while those freedoms are being destroyed by sophistry
and dialectics. ' 10 9
The substance of this part of Mr. Justice Black's objection was
revealed in a blistering dissent he wrote in response to a Frankfurter
opinion which upheld a criminal libel statute under first amendment
attack.
We are told that freedom of petition and discussion are in no
danger "while this Court sits." This case raises considerable
doubt. Since those who peacefully petition for changes in the
law are not to be protected "while this Court sits," who is?
I do not agree that the Constitution leaves freedom of petition,
assembly, speech, press or worship at the mercy of a case-bycase, day-by-day majority of this Court. I had supposed that
our people could rely for their freedom on the Constitution's
commands, rather than on the grace of this Court on an individual basis." 0
The Beaukarnais dissent introduces with equal persuasion, the other
factors which have led Mr. Black to reject the balancing approach. I
refer to what Black regards as the perversion of interest identification
and weighing as manifested by the Frankfurter opinion. In rejecting the
approach because of its inherent susceptibility to these tragically debilitating perversions, he began by explaining his own view:
I think that the First Amendment, with the Fourteenth, "absolutely" forbids such laws without any "ifs" or "buts" or
"whereases." Whatever the danger, if any, in such public discussions, it is a danger the Founders deemed outweighed by
the danger incident to the stifling of thought and speech. The
Court does not act on this view of the Founders. It calculates
what is deemed to be the danger of public discussion, holds the
scales are tipped on the side of state suppression, and upholds
state censorship. This method of decision offers little protection
to First Amendment liberties "while this Court sits.""'
It is this total disagreement with the definition and weighing of the
interests, (in addition to his instinctive opposition to the consequence
of dependency upon the humans who populate the Court it engenders),
which has confirmed his opposition to the balancing technique. It is a
disagreement regarding the weight to be given on both sides of the balance. The point is often made in the opinions in which, having stated
his absolutist response to questions of degree, he goes on to demonstrate
how he would balance the interests were such a course open to him.
In effect he would both define and weigh the interests to be balanced
109. Id.
110. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 274-275 (1952).
111. Id. at 275.
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in a fashion strikingly different from that usually employed by the Court.
When an individual's first amendment freedoms are infringed upon by
some action, Justice Black would define the first amendment interest in
terms of society, not the individual.1 2 Where the opposing social interest
is hatred of an idea, or disgust with it, or fear of its polluting potential
(or any other reaction to its offensiveness), he so thoroughly discounts
the interest as to inevitably find the balance struck in favor of absolute
freedom of expression. Indeed, it is not surprising to find him pointing
out the presence of important first amendment interest in the very
quality which so often leads to the offense-the prodding, provoking,
disturbing effect of an idea which fails to conform to the accepted notions
of the day.
In a sentence, then, it is Mr. Justice Black's position that, regardless
of the depth of its intensity or the breadth of its consensus, no interest
justified in terms of the offensiveness of an idea or expression can ever
outweigh the interest which a democratic society has in preserving unqualified freedom in the market-place-of-ideas.
3.

PUBLIC ORDER AND POLITICAL FREEDOM

The final, and easily the most troublesome category, at least from
Justice Black's standpoint, consists of claims that the public interest in
preserving order should, on balance, result in some limiting of political
expression. Indeed, the claims do present him with a conflict between
his great fear of judicially administered limitation on discussion and
his admitted conclusion that government has a duty to preserve peace
and order."' But it is not a conflict that he would solve by choosing one
interest over the other or by balancing. Instead he has developed an
alternative set of tools designed to reach an accommodation between order
and expression while also permitting as little judicial latitude as is
possible."'
112. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 73 (1961):
The interest in free association at stake here is not merely the personal interest
of the petitioner . . . It is the interest of all the people in having a society in
which no one is intimidated with respect to his beliefs or associations.
113. "[Tihe preservation of peace and order is one of the first duties of government."
Milkwagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 317 (1941).
114. The gist of his objection to the weighing test was set forth only recently in his
separate opinion in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 399-400 (1967):

Some of us have pointed out from time to time that the First Amendment freedoms could not possibly live with the adoption of that Constitution-ignoring-anddestroying technique, when there are, as here, palpable penalties imposed on speech
or press specifically because of the views that are spoken or printed. The prohibitions of the Constitution were written to prohibit certain specific things, and
one of the specific things prohibited is a law which abridges freedom of the press.
That freedom was written into the Constitution and that Constitution is or
should be binding on judges as well as other public officers. The "weighing"
doctrine plainly encourages and actually invites judges to choose for themselves
between conflicting values, even where, as in the First Amendment, the Founders
made a choice of values, one of which is a free press. Though the Constitution
requires that judges swear to obey and enforce it, it is not altogether strange that
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Mr. Justice Black begins his approach by reiterating his conviction
that society has no legitimate interest of any degree sufficient to justify
repressing ideas as ideas. Law and order are not disrupted by ideas, but
by conduct. Hence his attempt to accomodate the two great values of
political expression and the preservation of order is phrased in terms
of the distinction between ideas and their expression on the one hand,
and conduct and its disruptive effect on the other. Yet the distinction is
not always a clear one and would seem to warrant some development.
There are at least three difficult categories of overlap which complicate the speech/action dichotomy urged by Justice Black. One consists
of the cases in which the speaker expresses disliked ideas, which thereby
invoke violent response on the part of the listeners and endanger both
the speaker and public order. A contemporary example of this category
is offered by the recent speaking tours of Governor Wallace. A second,
often closely related category, is that of speech which is as much, if not
more, conduct than it is speech. The notorious hypothetical false shout
of "Fire!" in the theatre is the most graphic illustration of this type of
problem. Still another problem for the dichotomy are the cases of demonstrable conduct, in which action is used to serve the function of speech.
Sit-in's and draft card burning's are examples of this category.
The cases presenting these difficult problems arise when the government, in the name of preserving peace and order, enacts laws or administers regulations which have the effect of limiting the freedom of
expression. Mr. Black has an interesting approach to these problems
aimed at allowing reasonable general regulations and still protecting
speech. If, either as written or applied, the regulation tends to turn on
the content of the expression, he calls it a "direct" infringement on freedom of expression and strikes it down as an outright abridgment of
speech without concerning himself with the public order considerations.
Conversely, if the law is a regulation applied even-handedly, without
regard for the content of the expression, he will proceed to consider it
in terms of the interest in public order. If we integrate this direct/indirect
approach with the categories of difficulty for the speech/action distinction, we can see its effect.
Where the speech only constitutes a threat to the public order
because the audience dislikes it, Mr. Black insists that the thrust of
an interest in preserving the peace is to penalize the disruptive conduct
in the audience. For to do otherwise would allow audiences to effect
"direct" abridgments in the name of law and order by themselves provoking disturbance of law and order." 5 Moreover, because the speaker
all judges are not always dead set against constitutional interpretations that expand
their powers, and that when power is once claimed by some, others are loath to
give it up.
115. See, e.g., the description of direct in Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 71
(1961), as aimed at "control of the content of speech."
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is only speaking, not acting, there is no basis to subject him to other than
the indirect incidental restraints of time and place regulation.
Where, however, the speech is action itself, either by triggering
action or by using acts as a means of expression, it is permissable to
regulate it so long as the regulation is of conduct and not of the idea
content. The situation is essentially the same in the category of demonstrable conduct except that the usual substance of the demonstration is
such that Black sees more potential application of indirect regulation
than with the more verbal mediums of expression."" 6
It is important to explain how Black's approach differs from those
who balance the interests. There are two major points of distinction.
First, by limiting the balancing process to conduct as opposed to speech,
Black exempts vast categories of expression from any balancing at all.
Second, even when he balances, the direct/indirect analysis enables him
to focus on the critical considerations of selective animus which truly
lie at the heart of the first amendment problems." 7 In these ways he
defines the extent of its protection.
C.

Defining the ProhibitedAbridgements

Our attention is now directed toward discovering the identity of
the actors and actions against which Justice Black would have the Court
116. In Cox. v. Louisiana, 379 (U.S. 537, 577 (1965), he wrote:
A state statute . . . regulating conduct-patroling and marching-as distinguished
from speech, would in my judgment be constitutional, subject only to the condition
that if such a law had the effect of indirectly impinging on freedom of speech,
press or religion, it would be unconstitutional if under the circumstances it appeared
that the State's interest in suppressing the conduct was not sufficient to outweigh the
individual's interest in engaging in conduct closely involving his First Amendment
freedoms.
117. The role of animus is most clearly apparent in the civil rights demonstration
suits. Black has had particular difficulty with these cases, and often has departed from his
liberal colleagues as regards their treatment of them. He was especially upset by their decision to retroactively apply federal legislation in order to reverse convictions for sit-ins.
Hamm v. Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964). Justice Black is motivated here by an uneasiness
with the "modern" type of demonstration, especially with regard to its implications for
private parties to be left alone, for government's duty to preserve order, and for the
people and the government to protect against interference with the orderly administration
of public responsibilities. It was not surprising, therefore: to find him dissenting in Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); or to find him pleading for further clarification by the
court regarding the desire of "many earnest, honest, good people in this Nation . . . to
know exactly how far they have a constitutional right to go on in using the public streets
to advocate causes they consider just" in Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 742 (1965) ; or
in this last term when he more clearly extended his interests to private property as well, in
a dissent in Amalgamated Food Imp. U. Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, -U.S.-, -, 88
S. Ct. 1601 1614 (1968): "I believe that whether this Court likes it or not the constitution
recognizes and supports the concept of private ownership of property ....
This means to me
that there is no right to picket on the private premises of another to try to convert the
owner or others to the views of the pickets." Finally, it was not surprising to find him in
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1967) writing the Court's first opinion in a long while sustaining convictions of such demonstrators for mischievous trespass on state jail grounds,
conditioning the holding, of course, on the "even-handed enforcement" of the law without
regard to the content of the expression.
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defend the protected liberties. An appropriate starting point is the notion
of "incorporation," easily the most distinctive of Justice Black's contributions to thought in this area. Apparently the incorporation doctrine
was not a notion the Justice brought with him when he first took his
place upon the bench. Black was nearly ten years into his tenure before
he initially declared his conviction, in Adamson v. California,1n that the
first section of the fourteenth amendment was designed by its authors to
incorporate all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, and thereby make
all of those assurances available as restraints upon the exercise of state
power as they had served as limitations upon the power of the federal
government."' This proposition was an alternative and a reaction to the
prevailing interpretation afforded the fourteenth amendment which consisted of piecemeal selective incorporation of certain of the rights. It is
in contrasting the incorporation theory with the existing interpretative
regime that its significance as a contribution to constitutional thought is
most clearly demonstrated.
At the outset at least, the incorporation theory afforded far more
protection than the more general due process view in force at the time.
When first announced by Justice Black, only the just compensation
principle and the general outlines of the first amendment guarantees had
been given effect under the prevailing rubric of fundamental rights essential to the concept of "ordered liberty."' 2 ° Black's theory would have immediately made all of the provisions applicable. A second major innovation flowing from incorporation concerns the standards of their judicial
enforcement. Under the fundamental liberty rubric, the standards could
be different from those employed in cases of federal action. Generally
this meant greater latitude for the states and thus less protection of the
liberties. Under Black's approach, the states would be required to comply
with the same degree of protection that was accorded the rights in the
federal arena.
It is interesting to trace the subsequent support afforded the incorporation theory. In the years since its enunciation in Adamson, the
theory has commanded the endorsement of many of the justices who
have sat upon the Court, but has never commanded a majority in any
case. Nonetheless, its influence may be measured by other standards, the
most telling of which has been the steady progress toward the goals of
incorporation by majorities which continue to adhere to the selective
approach. As of this writing, almost all of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been made applicable to the states, and the bulk of them
have been applied with equal force under uniform national standards.12'
118. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
119. For a critique of his historical analysis see, Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).

120. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
121. The present status of incorporation was developed by Justice Goldberg in Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 410-414 (1965).

HUGO L. BLACK
In short, while Justice Black has yet to win the battle of incorporation,
it appears that he is well along the way toward triumph in the war.
Whichever reading of the Fourteenth Amendment's content prevails,
the incorporation theory, and the more flexible selective absorption policy
raise additional issues regarding the identity of the action and actors
against which our liberties are to be protected. Unlike the First Amendment, whose prohibitions are directed only at Congress, the Fourteenth
is phrased in terms of the "state." This contrasting thrust has presented
the Court with a critical task of definition.
At the outset, one might have expected Justice Black, driven by
his evidenced prejudice for preserving the realm of permissible state
activity and equally motivated by his fear of expandable judicial standards, to insist upon a narrow, literal construction of the term "state."
Indeed, an interpretation limiting the reach of the fourteenth amendment
to action of the state legislature would have been consistent with the
equality of federal/state treatment demanded by his incorporation
doctrine. Yet such constructions have never been espoused by Mr. Justice
Black. Instead he can be placed in the midst of those endorsing an
expansive, indeed a flexible, construction of the term "state" which has
' Justice Black
thus been transformed into the concept of "state action."122
has generally assented to the line of cases which now requires that all
branches of the states' official complex, as well as many quasi-official and
officially "colored" activities, conform their efforts to the principles and
prohibitions of our fundamental liberties. Indeed, most of the limits he
has drawn in the state action cases seem designed to preserve viable
latitude for the states and can be confined to infrequent instances in
which he has insisted upon greater proof of official animus rather than
by narrowing the construction of state action. 23
On the whole, Justice Black has sought to expand the protective
reach of the libertarian negatives through a rather organic and hence
flexible approach to the state action question. Perhaps his most eloquent
effort in this area came in the company-town case of Marsh v. Alabama.124
In many ways, his opinion in that case explains all that need be explained
relating to his reasons for approving the broad construction of the term
"state." In rejecting the contention of the town owners that their property
rights entitled them to impose restraints upon expression, he chided,
"Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The more an owner,
for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the public in general,
the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and con122. See, for a somewhat slanted but interesting discussion of Justice Black's position
on the "state action issue," Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the

Talisman of State Action, 1965 DUKE L.J. 219.
123. E.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 266 (1964), and the cases he discusses therein. See

also, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
124. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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stitutional rights of those who use it."'2 5 Yet there was more than a
lecture on good conduct involved in Marsh; Justice Black saw the interests of democracy involved. To protect that interest, he held the town
to be within the ambit of the state action concept, and his opinion tells
us why:
Many people in the United States live in company owned
towns. These people, just as residents of municipalities, are free
citizens of their State and country. Just as all other citizens they
must make decisions which affect the welfare of their community
and the nation. To act as good citizens they must be informed.
be properly informed their informaIn order to enable them to
26
tion must be uncensored.
Justice Black's response in the Marsh case is typical of his perspective throughout the entire fourteenth amendment area. Significantly, his
methodology contrasts markedly with the approach we have heretofore
examined. He does not manifest his characteristic insistence on fixed,
objective standards. There is no attempt to apply literalism; there are
no expressions of frustration or despair with judicial expansion of the
plain meaning of the term "state" such as he offers in the cases dealing
with definitions of the first amendment liberties themselves. Indeed,
there seems to be little or no concern with methodology at all.
This is a different Justice Black at work. It seems as though the
considerations which led him to resist judicial latitude in all of the areas
we have previously discussed somehow no longer are compelling for him
when he addresses himself to the challenge of protecting the liberties
once they have been defined. Focused upon that somewhat different
challenge, Black himself becomes both the proponent and the practitioner
of judicial activism.
That the change in the tact is the dividing line for the change in
his approach is readily ratified by even a summary overview of his varied
efforts to identify and judicially reject both sophisticated and simple
minded forms of infringements on political liberty. Whenever he sees real
or potential abuse of this kind, he reacts by calling for whatever extension
of the protections can be marshalled from the language or implications of
constitutional provisions. Thus, the bill of attainder prohibition, rarely
considered by his fellow justices as anything than an incongruous antique,
is invoked so frequently and emotionally by Justice Black 2 7 as to suggest
myopia on someone's part. Loyalty oaths, once accepted by him as a
reasonable exercise of legislative authority, are now the subject of con125. Id. at 506.

126. Id. at 508.
127. Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
431 (1965); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961);

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
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tinued attack by the Justice on various constitutional grounds, especially
for first amendment reasons.'21

He wages a persistent if somewhat lonely

battle against the abuses pregnant in the contempt power." 9 A similar
response is invoked whenever the economic status of the citizen is used
to influence his choice of associations or beliefs, whether the device
employed is tax incentive' 0 or job discrimination.' 3' However small,
however justifiable as mere incidents of one's employment, forced contributions are likewise rejected if the use of the funds could be shown
to delimit the freedom to choose which political ideals one wishes to support. 32 Justice Black is frequently found exhorting his brethren to expand
the notions of liberty 3' and punishment' so as to widen the effective
scope of the protections against the abuses of a more sophisticated government in our more interdependent era. Similarly, he is to be found
employing the maxims of both strict construction' 3 5 and broad overview"' of legislative and administrative regimes in order to first expose
and thereafter invalidate those which are predicated on ideological discrimination. Whatever the device, however direct or indirect the method,
however blatant or subtle the camouflage, Justice Black raises his hypersensitive antennae and levels the abridgements with a sweep of his
protective pen.
Considered as isolated expressions relating to less commonly invoked
aspects of constitutional law, these efforts may seem insignificant to the
more comprehensive analysis of Justice Black's philosophy. Collected
and related to the interests he seeks to protect, however, they suggest
considerations of substantial significance. Professor Reich suggests that
these efforts, as indications of a heightened sensitivity to abuse in all
forms, qualifies Justice Black as the promoter of a "living constitution. 1"

7

While I would hesitate to join in that sweeping characterization,

it does seem appropriate to reach some understanding of the forces which
lead Black to manifest and urge this sensitivity.
The question is really one of perspective. And we need not guess
128. E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952); Adler v. Bd. of Education, 342

U.S. 485 (1952).
129. E.g., Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) ; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252 (1941).
130. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
131. See Weiman and Adler, supra note 127; Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442
(1954).
132. Lathrop v. Donhue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
133. E.g., In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961) ; Barsky v. Bd. of Regents, 347 U.S. 442
(1954) ; Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
134. E.g., Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
135. E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965) ; Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964).
136. E.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).

137. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. Rav. 673 (1963).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXII

about the forces which impel Black to that perspective for he has gone
to great length to explain them. Responding to what he considered to be
the potentially debilitating effect of Frankfurter's penchant for judicial
craftsmanship, he explained his perspective regarding the provisions of
the Bill of Rights'3 8 in these terms:
I cannot consider the Bill of Rights to be an outworn 18th Century "straitjacket" ......

Its provisions may be thought outdated

abstractions by some. And it is true that they were designed to
meet ancient evils. But they are the same kind of human evils
that have emerged from century to century wherever excessive
power is sought by the few at the expense of the many. In my
judgement the people of no nation can lose their liberty so long
as a Bill of Rights like ours survives and its basic purposes are
conscientiously interpreted, enforced, and respected, so as to
afford continuous protection against old, as well as new, devices
and practiceswhich might thwart those purposes....
I would follow what I believe was the original purpose of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments-to extend to all the people
of the nation the complete protection of the Bill of Rights. 8 '
And if this belief has led him to abandon, in this limited area, his distaste
for judicial subjectivity, it is a price which he has shown himself more
than willing to pay. For it is by doing so that he seeks to most fully
assure the continued commitment of our people to the democratic premise
upon which our nation was built.
VI.

CLOSING OBSERVATIONS

It is hoped that the discussion which has preceded has made it unnecessary to tender an extended summation of Justice Black's approach
to these three crucial issues of American constitutional democracy. In
each examined area, his commitment to impose the most viable construction of that system is clearly the compelling prejudice which shapes his
reasoning. In each, the results he reaches and the methods he employs
combine with the others to provide assurance that democracy in America
will have an opportunity to mature into the system promised by our
Constitution.
By rejecting the right of the judiciary to restrict the scope of our
legislatures' capacity to effect the will of the people, he has forced Americans to become more deeply involved in the task of self-government. By
removing the power of some groups to preclude others from equal participation in electing our legislative representatives, he has assured
138. Mr. Justice Black has explained that the phrase "Bill of Rights" is a mere shorthand expression which properly includes all liberties held by the people as against the power
of government. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865 (1960).
139. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 89 (1947) (Emphasis added).
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Americans that their laws will in fact be manifestations of popular rule.
And by resisting every threat of infringement upon the viability of the
political forum, he has further assured each citizen of the right to determine for himself the wisdom of the policies by which we shall live.
It has been said that Justice Black has failed to demonstrate the
qualities of a great jurist. 4 ' By the traditional lawyer's standard of
"judicial craftsmanship," this is probably true. And yet it seems altogether plausible that Mr. Justice Black would just as well have it so.
For his consuming motivation has not been to master the intricacies of
jurisprudence or of the judicial system, but to preserve and fulfill the
promise of our political system. And measured by that standard, it is
submitted that he will forever occupy a place of reverence in the hearts
of those who agree with him, that American constitutional democracy
represents "the last best hope of earth."
140. W.
ed. 1966).
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